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I.  Introduction and Purpose. 
Disabled individuals have historically been treated as second-class citizens in the United 
States.  While improvements have certainly been made over time, disabled individuals still face 
significant barriers to enjoying full and equal participation in society.  Higher education is one 
aspect of American society still lacking proportional representation of the disabled community.  
To try and understand why disabled Americans fail to thrive in higher education at rates 
approaching those of non-disabled individuals, this paper will examine the following: how the 
history of disability discrimination in America influenced passage of powerful anti-
discrimination legislation; how American courts have generally interpreted that legislation to the 
detriment of Americans with disabilities in higher education, and what is and is not a reasonable 
accommodation.  This paper will conclude with a summary of statistics pointing to the dearth of 
disabled student success in higher education, as well as suggestions of how the American legal 
system, and American higher education in general, could be improved to facilitate greater 
success for individuals with disabilities. 
II.  The History of Disability Discrimination  
To date, the United States Congress has passed three landmark pieces of legislation 
designed to address and minimize disability discrimination:  the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments 
Act of 2008.  While each legislative action has documented America at a particular stage in its 
battle to curtail disability discrimination, only the original ADA and the Rehabilitation Act will 
be discussed—with the ADA discussed in significantly greater detail—as these acts feature much 
more prominently in case law than the ADA Amendments Act, which is rarely if ever identified 
distinct from the original act.  
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A.  The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
In passing the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Congress recognized several 
important truths about American society.  Congress first and foremost recognized that many 
people with physical and mental disabilities were precluded from full participation in society due 
to disability discrimination.1  Congress recognized not only that society has historically engaged 
in such harmful practices, but also that discrimination on the basis of disability “continue[s] to be 
a serious and pervasive social problem.2  The problem of discrimination on the basis of disability 
was identified in almost every aspect of society, including education, employment, and health 
services.3  Disability discrimination was found not only in these various aspects of modern 
society, but in a myriad of practices, including “communication barriers, overprotective rules and 
policies, failure to make modifications to existing . . . practices, [and] exclusionary qualification 
standards and criteria.”4 
Responding to these findings of discrimination, Congress resolved “to invoke the sweep 
of congressional authority . . . in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-
day by people with disabilities.”5  Congress sought to “provide clear, strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”6  The 
scope of the Americans With Disabilities Act reveals an intent by Congress to cast a broad and 
inclusive net across the spectrum of disabilities.  For example, Congress could have defined an 
individual with a disability simply as a person incapable of any given physical activity.  Such a 
                                                 
1 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(1). 
2 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(2). 
3 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(3). 
4 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(4). 
5 42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(4). 
6 42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(2). 
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limited definition would have been consistent with the medical model view of disability central 
to the Civil War pension system, which “linked the definition of disability to an inability to 
work.”7  Instead, Congress chose to define an individual with a disability as a person with “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,”8 an 
individual who in the past has had “a record of such an impairment,”9 or a person who has been 
judged or “regarded as having such an impairment.”10 
B – Expansive Definition of Disability under the ADA 
Expanding the definition of a disabled individual to include those with past and present 
mental and physical disabilities provides strong evidence of how pervasive Congress found 
disability discrimination to be, and how its modern approach was to differ from the past.  Past 
conception of disability revolved around the Medical Model of the Civil War pension system, 
where “veterans with ‘invisible’ disabilities often were portrayed as scamming the system, 
exploiting the public treasury and trust.”11  As Blanck notes, “[t]here is much that remains from 
this period of American history that is relevant today regarding negative conceptions of 
disability.”12  However, instead of clinging to outdated and isolating conceptions of disability, 
one major step taken by Congress was to bring so-called “hidden” disabilities—mental 
impairments—to the forefront of legitimate disability consideration.  Even then, Congress could 
have limited applicability of the ADA to only a handful of relatively well-known mental 
impairments, such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia.  Instead, Congress accepted the 
                                                 
7 Disability Law and Policy, p. 6. 
8 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(A). 
9 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(B). 
10 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(C). 
11 Disability Law and Policy, p. 6-7. 
12 Disability Law and Policy, p. 7 
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definition of mental impairment proffered by the Department of Justice, which includes “[a]ny 
mental or psychological disorder such as intellectual disability, organic brain syndrome, 
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disability.”13  One would be hard pressed to 
suggest use of the phrase “any” as indicating a narrow construction of disability, but perhaps 
anticipating such an attempt, Congress acted to ensure that “the definition of disability . . . shall 
be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted by 
the terms”14of the ADA. 
Beyond an expansive definition of mental impairments, Congress also enabled 
application of the legal term disability to a vast range of physical impairments.  Broadly defined, 
physical impairments include physiological disorders or conditions, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss which affects at least one major body system, such as the neurological, 
musculoskeletal, or endocrine system.15  As one may by now expect, the range of conditions 
considered physical impairment for the purpose of ADA disability is quite diverse; the expansive 
list includes perhaps predictable impairments like “cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, 
[and] multiple sclerosis,”16 but also contains potential surprises such as “visual, speech, and 
hearing impairments . . . cancer, heart disease, diabetes . . . drug addiction, and alcoholism.”17 
While the sprawling applicability of disability to a vast range of mental and physical 
conditions surely evidences congressional intent to protect as many people from shame, scrutiny, 
and isolation as possible, another aspect of the definition of disability offers perhaps even 
                                                 
13 “Revised Final Title II Rule: A Compilation of Regulatory Provisions and Guidance—Nondiscrimination on the 
Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services,” §35.108 (b)(1)(ii), accessed October 11, 2019, 
https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/titleII_2010/titleII_2010_regulations.htm 
14 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(A) 
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stronger evidence:  the list of actions legally considered to be “major life activities.”  Defining 
major life activity for legal purposes seems another area in which Congress could have taken a 
conservative approach and included only activities like working.  Instead, Congress declared that 
“major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself . . . eating, sleeping, 
walking, standing . . . learning, reading, concentrating . . . and working.”18   
Further indicating Congressional intent to offer broad spectrum protection for people 
with disabilities are two points within the definition of what “substantially limits” a major life 
activity.  Faced again with the chance to offer only narrowly-defined and conservative legal 
scope to limitations, Congress rather boldly proclaimed an “impairment that is episodic or in 
remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”19  
Further, Congress mandated “[a]n impairment that substantially limits one major life activity 
need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability.”20  Note as well 
that “[t]here is no absolute standard for determining when an impairment is a substantial 
limitation.”21 
The administrators of the medical model of disability must have been turning in their 
graves when Congress opened the gates of disability recognition to mental illness and periodic 
impairment.    Perhaps not quite as disturbing to the architects of government-sponsored 
disability discrimination, yet still a laudable progressive leap for Congress, was to declare “the 
determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made 
                                                 
18 42 U.S.C. §12102(2)(A) 
19 42 U.S.C. §12104(4)(D) 
20 42 U.S.C. §12104(4)(C) 
21 “ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual,” II-2.4000, accessed October 13, 2020, 
https://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-1.2000 
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without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures. . . .”22  In other words, a 
person with a disability—almost without exception—does not risk losing disability protection if 
they are able to benefit from the use of “medications for conditions like epilepsy or major 
depression, a prosthetic leg, a hearing device, or insulin used to control diabetes.”23   
The most notable exception to the continued protection of disability status despite use of 
mitigating measures is that “[t]he ameliorative effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary 
eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered in determining whether an impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity.”24  Effectively, this means the “ADA does not apply to 
people whose vision is corrected with ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses.”25  Despite this 
exception, it is clear Congress recognized that “individuals with disabilities continually 
encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion,”26 and took 
bold action proscribe disability discrimination. 
However, I do not mean to suggest that Congress sought to protect absolutely every 
behavior or physical condition as a disability.  Far from it.  In the most practical sense, Congress 
applied a modest temporal barrier to disability protection by creating an exception for transitory 
impairments, such as broken bones, “with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”27  
Even here it should be noted that “the issue of whether a temporary impairment is significant 
                                                 
22 42 U.S.C. §12104(4)(E). 
23 Sheryl Ellis.  Making It Work: Managing your health condition through ADA workplace accommodations. A 
Guide for Employees.  P. 96.  Augmented HR Solutions.  April 18, 2020.   
24 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(E)(ii). 
25 Ellis, Making it Work, p. 97. 
26 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(5). 
27 42 U.S.C. §12102(3)(B). 
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enough to be a disability must be resolved on a case-by-case basis,” 28 where the (expected) 
duration of the impairment is balanced against the limitation it actually imposes. 
Moving on from temporary injuries, Congress also saw fit to exclude “the color of one’s 
eyes, hair, or skin . . . disadvantages attributable to environmental, cultural, or economic factors . 
. . [or] common personality traits such as poor judgment or a quick temper, where these are not 
symptoms of a mental or psychological disorder.”29 In other words, disadvantages experienced 
due to having red hair, dark skin, or living in an environmental justice community30 do not 
qualify an individual for disability protection.   
Despite the ADA’s acceptance of science in understanding and protecting as disabled 
those with a myriad range of permanent physical and mental impairments, there was a line that 
Congress was not willing to cross.  That line was extending disability protection to people whose 
biological identity is inexplicably confusing and offensive to many Americans.  And while it is 
admittedly unthinkable to consider a normal biological identity like transgender as a disability in 
and of itself, Congress unfortunately bowed to the political will of those offended by when it 
excluded “transsexualism . . . [and] gender identity disorders not resulting from physical 
impairments”31 from disability protection despite the crushing weight of social judgment 
transgender people often endure.  Allowing people the choice to secure disability protection for 
gender identity disorders hardly seems reasonable when considering transgender youth 
                                                 
28 “ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual,” II-2.4000, https://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-1.2000, accessed 
October 13, 2020. 
29 “ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual,” II-2.2000, accessed October 13, 2020, 
https://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-2.2000 
30 “The Environmental Justice Movement,” accessed October 13, 2020, https://www.nrdc.org/stories/environmental-
justice-movement 
31 “ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual,” II-2.7000, accessed October 13, 2020, 
https://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-2.7000 
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experience nearly four times the risk of depression of their non-transgender peers,32 and “40 
percent of transgender adults have attempted suicide during their lifetime, compared to less than 
five percent of the US population as a whole.”33 
Minding that the ADA as a whole is a well-meaning but imperfect means of legal 
protection for people with disabilities across the scope of American society, two of the ADA’s 
four titles pertain directly to higher education and will be further discussed.  Title II pertains to 
institutions of higher education operated by public entities, and Title III pertains to similar 
institutions operated by private entities. 
C.  ADA Title II – Public Services (42 U.S.C. §§12131 – 12165) 
 Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act seeks to ensure that “no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in 
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected 
to discrimination by any such entity.”34  While ADA Title II makes no specific reference to any 
institution of higher education, it is a logical assumption that such entities are subsumed within 
the definition of a “public entity,” which encompasses any state or local government, 
department, agency, or other instrumentality.35  For those who are hesitant to make such 
assumptions on legal matters, consider that Title II does not specifically mention state prisons, 
either—but an argument to exempt a Pennsylvania state prison from Title II because prisons are 
not generally considered benefits or services of a public entity was flatly rejected by Justice 
                                                 
32 Human Rights Campaign Foundation.  Mental Health and the LGBTQ Community.  
https://suicidepreventionlifeline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LGBTQ_MentalHealth_OnePager.pdf.  Accessed 
December 1, 2020. 
33 Id. 
34 42 U.S.C. §12132. 
35 42 U.S.C. §12131 (1)(A) and (B). 
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Scalia, who pointed to the “broad language used by Congress and its choice not to include 
exceptions.”36  As such, Title II applies to any college, university, or other institution of higher 
education operated by a state or local government, such as a state medical, veterinary, or law 
school.  The definition of a “qualified individual with a disability” under ADA Title II is much 
more direct, and for relevant purposes “means an individual with a disability who, with or 
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . or the provision of auxiliary 
aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for . . . participation in programs or 
activities provided by a public entity.”37  
D.  ADA Title III – Public Accommodations . . . Operated by Private Entities 
Generally, Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against any individual “on the 
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation. . . .”38  Unlike Title II of 
the ADA, which assumes applicability to public institutions of higher education, Title III makes 
explicit reference to the undergraduate and postgraduate private schools to which it applies.39  
Likewise, where Title II provides almost no guidance as to what constitutes discrimination by a 
public college or university, Title III articulates several specific forms of discrimination by a 
private college or university.  Title III’s provision against “failure to make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures . . . unless the entity can demonstrate that 
making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature”40 of its program seems to be 
                                                 
36 Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 
524 U.S. 206 (1998). 
37 42 U.S.C. §12131 (2). 
38 41 U.S.C. §12182 (a). 
39 42 U.S.C. §12181 (7)(J). 
40 42 U.S.C. §12182 (b)(2)(A)(ii) 
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the most important provision in terms of relevant case law, as will be shown by the discussion of 
case law to follow. 
III – The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
 Before discussing case law pertaining to disability discrimination in higher education, it 
is worthwhile to consider how the Americans with Disabilities Act expanded upon the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  Most closely linked in time to the medical model of disability and 
the greatest intensity of disability discrimination, the Rehabilitation Act was Congress’ first real 
acknowledgement that preventing disability discrimination was in the best interest of broader 
society.  As such, the Rehabilitation Act is laudable for its acknowledgement that “disability is a 
natural part of the human experience and in no way diminishes the right of individuals to . . . 
enjoy full inclusion and integration in the economic . . . and educational mainstream of American 
society.”41  Likewise, the 1973 Act’s acknowledgement that “a high proportion of students with 
disabilities is leaving secondary education without being . . . enrolled in postsecondary 
education,”42 evidences Congress saw disability discrimination in higher education as 
detrimental and actionable long before passage of the ADA in 1990. 
 Recognizing a widespread problem, Congress decided to make the Rehabilitation Act 
applicable to “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”43  Broken down 
further, “any program or activity” is defined to include both public systems of higher education 
such as colleges and universities,44 as well as private organizations “principally engaged in the 
                                                 
41 29 U.S.C. §701 (a)(3)(F). 
42 29 U.S.C. §701 (a)(7)(A). 
43 29 U.S.C. §794 (a). 
44 29 U.S.C. §794 (b)(2)(A). 
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business of providing education,”45 giving the Rehabilitation Act equal applicability to higher 
education as the ADA. 
 And yet, despite its commendable recognition of disability discrimination in America, 
and the broad scope of its authority, the Rehabilitation Act clearly failed to solve the problem.  
Just as subsequent passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act failed to solve the problem of 
discrimination on the basis of disability.  Of course, it must be noted that both the Rehabilitation 
Act and the ADA provided legal framework for dramatic gains in equalizing civil rights for 
individuals with disabilities.  Additionally, at least in the case of the ADA, Congressional intent 
was substantially impaired by consistent judicial conservatism and narrow interpretation of the 
Act’s provisions.  While this pattern of narrow interpretation ultimately triggered passage of the 
ADAAA in 2008, and the law is ostensibly more favorable to individuals with disabilities 
pursuing higher education, the following discussion of relevant case law intends to show this aim 
has not necessarily become reality. 
IV – Case Law pertaining to Disability Discrimination in Higher Education. 
 When it comes to the case law regarding disability discrimination in higher education, 
certain fundamental aspects warrant immediate attention.  As a practical matter, at least two of 
the federal circuits have adopted the approach of analyzing Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims 
together, since the provisions and procedures of both acts are generally equivalent.46 
Since 1991, an institution of higher education has had something of an escape route from 
providing accommodation, though the imposition is high:  the institution must submit undisputed 
                                                 
45 29 U.S.C. §794 (b)(3)(A)(ii). 
46 Dean v. University. at Buffalo School of Medicine & Biomedical Sciences, 804 F.3d 178, 187 (2nd Cir. 2015) and 
Stern v. University of Osteopathic Medicine & Health Services., 220 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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facts demonstrating that it considered “alternative means, their feasibility, cost and effect on the 
academic program, and came to a rationally justifiable conclusion that the available alternatives 
would result either in lowering academic standards or requiring substantial program alteration.”47  
If the institution succeeds in meeting this burden, however, “the court could rule as a matter of 
law that the institution had met its duty of seeking reasonable accommodation,”48 and further 
fact finding would only be necessary if there was a genuine dispute of material fact, or there was 
“significantly probative evidence of bad faith or pretext.”49   
 Absent such an uncontested set of facts, there are additional routes to quick dismissal of 
accommodation requests—even when the accommodations might seem “reasonable” to the 
outside observer.  For example, “[a] publicly funded academic institution is not obligated to 
accommodate under the ADA until receiving a proper diagnosis and request for specific 
accommodation.”50  A student requesting accommodation bears the burden of not only 
completing a request for accommodation, but proving that they did so.  In Buescher v. Baldwin 
Wallace University, a student recently admitted to an accelerated nursing program engaged in 
email conversations with school officials regarding disability accommodation, but never 
completed the formal application for accommodations.  The court held there could be no failure 
to accommodate since no accommodation request was made.51  As much as I now seek to 
advocate for the disabled individual against the institution—and I do, with great passion 
motivated from infuriating personal experience—it is difficult to side against an institution that 
did not provide accommodations when its official process was never completed, as was the case 
                                                 
47 Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1991). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Johnson v. Washington County Career Center, 470 Fed.Appx. 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2012). 
51 Buescher v. Baldwin Wallace University, 86 F.Supp. 3d 789, 806 (N.D. Ohio 2015). 
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when plaintiff Buescher “was given the application for Disability Services . . . and did not 
complete it.”52  However, I can and will find fault with a school—or any institution—that 
engages in disability request communications for over three months, including one in which its 
own professional disability specialist informs the student that accommodations are simply 
unavailable in their program, only to hide behind the fact that the student did not complete a 
formal application.53  Nursing, for example, is hard enough for students without disabilities.  
Students with disabilities attempting to participate in such high-demand programs only have 
greater difficulty to contend with, and expecting the school to be proactive in helping the student 
succeed should not be considered unreasonable. 
 Pulling Buescher into the discussion of what is and is not a reasonable accommodation, 
one could say an accommodation is de facto unreasonable if it is not formally requested.  
Similarly, any request for accommodation must be made before failure results from the alleged 
disability to be accommodated.  In Choi v. University of Texas Health Sciences Center, dental 
student Jin Choi was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder during his second year, but did 
not inform the school of his disability diagnosis until he had failed one of his clinical courses and 
the school had initiated his dismissal from the program.54  Choi attempted to overcome his 
failure to notify the school—a failure he does not contest—by alleging his limitations were open 
and obvious to the dental school.55 Choi supported his claim with several unsubstantiated  
allegations, including “three faculty members [who] asked him if he had a learning disability 
after he received a failing grade in a third-year course.”56  The court was not convinced, and 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Choi v. University of Texas Health Sci. Ctr. At San Antonio, 663 Fed.Appx. 214, 215 (5th Cir. 2015).  
55 Id. at 216. 
56 Id. 
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ultimately affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Choi’s claims because he “alleged 
insufficient facts to show that his disability and its consequential limitations were known by the 
Dental School.”57   
From the perspective of a law student nearing graduation, I can say that the need to 
request legally significant accommodations in advance seems fairly obvious.  What I hope to 
always remember, and would encourage all in the legal profession to remember, is that nuanced 
understanding of practical law is rare.  Considering the staggering amount of time people 
engaged in higher education programs must dedicate to succeed, it is not unrealistic to accept 
how an intelligent person might fail to request their accommodation in advance, or fail to 
complete the specific forms, or otherwise leap successfully through the necessary hoops.  Clearly 
this misunderstanding has no useful benefit in litigation—a plaintiff cannot use the excuse of “I 
didn’t know any better” to their advantage—but I find it a helpful consideration nonetheless.  
A parallel and equally helpful consideration to retain when considering these and other 
unfortunate errors that preclude disabled students from receiving accommodation is the intense 
pressure to avoid admitting one has a disability, for fear of that knowledge percolating through 
the ranks of one’s peers.  In Doe v. Samuel Merritt University, a plaintiff seeking 
accommodation to allow unlimited retakes of the American Podiatric Medical Licensing 
Examination, Part I—contrary to the school’s established policy, where three failures results in 
dismissal58--took the rare and generally prohibited step of using a fictitious name throughout her 
legal proceedings to ensure her disability was not publicly associated with her.59  The plaintiff 
pointed to the fact that podiatry is an extremely close-knit field, with only nine podiatry schools 
                                                 
57 Id. 
58 Doe v. Samuel Merritt University, No. C-13-00007 JSC, 2013 WL 497903 (N.D. Cal. February 8, 2013). 
59 Doe v. Samuel Merritt Univ., No. C-13-0000 JSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59527 (N.D. Cal. April 25, 2013). 
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in the United States, and that public disclosure of her disability would cause irreparable harm to 
her marketability as a candidate for employment.60  For the reasons plaintiff alleged, and because 
no party to the litigation objected to the plaintiff’s desire for anonymity, she was allowed to 
proceed under a fictitious name despite this practice running “afoul of the public's common law 
right of access to judicial proceedings.”61Consider the field of veterinary medicine, supplied by 
only “32 schools or colleges of veterinary medicine (CVMs) in the U.S. that are accredited or 
have accreditation pending.”62  I believe it would take willful ignorance not to recognize that a 
student with a mental or physical limitation might seek to conceal that knowledge as much as 
possible, when the field is so close-knit and competitive.  The College of Veterinary Medicine at 
Colorado State University, for example received 2,284 applications for its class of 2023; that 
class consists of 149 students, meaning there were 15.3 applicants for every available seat.63  
 Apart from accommodations improperly requested, disability accommodations can also 
be denied without judgment of illegal discrimination when the specific accommodation cannot 
be shown to be related to the disability.  In Stern v. University of Osteopathic Medicine & Health 
Services, a student with dyslexia was admitted to medical school and requested an 
accommodation that would allow him to “supplement answers on any multiple-choice tests 
required, either with an essay or with responses to oral questioning.”64  The school refused to 
provide the requested accommodation, and the student sued under the Rehabilitation Act.65 
                                                 
60 Id. at *3. 
61 Id. at *1 
62 Association of American Veterinary Medical Colleges, FAQs, How many veterinary medical schools are there in 
the United States? https://www.aavmc.org/about-aavmc/faqs/#media Accessed December 2, 2020. 
63 Association of American Veterinary Medical Colleges, Admitted Student Statistics, 
https://www.aavmc.org/becoming-a-veterinarian/what-to-know-before-you-apply/admitted-student-statistics/ 
accessed December 2, 2020. 
64 Stern v. Univ. of Osteopathic Med. & Health Servs., 220 F.3d 906, 907 (8th Cir. 2000). 
65 Id. 
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 As is routine in the context of disability discrimination litigation, cases of higher 
education disability discrimination follow the burden-shifting framework established under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in McDonnell-Douglas.66  Adapted to an academic context, a plaintiff-
student bears the “burden of producing evidence of the existence of a reasonable accommodation 
that would enable [the student] to meet the educational institution’s essential eligibility 
requirements.”67  Plaintiff Stern, in the instant case, satisfied this initial burden by demonstrating 
his diagnosis of dyslexia and his request for an alternative testing method.68  Typically, once a 
plaintiff has made their initial showing of the existence of a reasonable accommodation, the 
burden shifts back to the educational institution, which may rebut the plaintiff’s showing in one 
of two ways: by producing evidence that implementation of the requested accommodation would 
require substantial—and thus unreasonable—modification of its existing academic program, or 
that the requested accommodations, reasonable or not, would not enable the student to meet their 
required academic standards.69  Defendant university here seems to have opted for a third option, 
as it did not prove Stern’s proposed accommodation would impose a substantial modification to 
its academic program, nor did it show that Stern’s proposed scheme would not enable him to 
meet the school’s required standards.  Instead, the university explained that it had offered an 
alternative accommodation—administration of exams in an oral format, in a separate room, with 
extra time—and provided the expert testimony of a psychologist familiar with dyslexia who 
believed such accommodation would account for any deficiency attributable to Stern’s 
dyslexia.70  The burden then shifted back to Stern to show why his proposed testing 
                                                 
66 McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
67 Zukle v.Regents of the Univ. of California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999) 
68 Stern at 907. 
69 Zukle at 1047. 
70 Stern at 908. 
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accommodation would benefit him and address his dyslexia in a way that the school’s proposal 
would not.  Stern could not offer an explanation, and the court concluded he “failed to meet his 
burden of showing that the accommodations that he requested were actually related to his 
disability.”71  The court’s underlying concern, and a worthy takeaway from the case, is that an 
accommodation failing to specifically address a particular individual’s disability condition—
instead simply making an essential requirement like testing easier for any person who might 
receive it—will not be considered a reasonable accommodation. 
 Stern does not elaborate on why the plaintiff failed to explain how his proposed testing 
accommodation, of allowing supplementary written answers, would enable him to overcome his 
dyslexia and succeed in the medical school program.  It is, of course, possible that he was faking 
the whole thing; that he never had dyslexia, and simply wanted easier testing.  However, I find it 
highly unlikely a person would go to the trouble of faking a disability and requesting an 
accommodation if they had the grades—as plaintiff Stern did—to get into the program in the first 
place.  It is unfortunate, in my mind, that one expert was able to torpedo Stern’s request for 
accommodation because in his one opinion, dyslexia could be otherwise accommodated.  He is, 
after all, only one expert, and the human brain is an impossibly complex organ.  I do not find it 
unreasonable to believe Stern knew something that would help him that one expert did not 
understand.  Plus, as I imagine most any professor can attest, granting a student the ability to 
write additional words in answer to an exam question in no way guarantees the student will get 
the right answer.  If Stern did not know the material, he would have failed regardless of how he 
was allowed to deliver the answer. 
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Beyond accommodations that are not in fact requested, and those that are not shown to be 
specifically related to a disability, accommodations may also be considered unreasonable and 
denied—or a discrimination lawsuit alleging denial of accommodations dismissed--if the 
accommodation requests are not sufficiently articulated.  Echoing the back-and-forth 
communication breakdown of Buechler, a student who “vaguely asserts that he sent numerous 
letters and made phone calls to University officials . . . requesting accommodations”72 is highly 
unlikely to prove that disability discrimination is the reason he did not receive the 
accommodations.  Specificity is essential not only to prove that accommodations were in fact 
requested, but also that the requests themselves provided a basis “for evaluating whether each 
request was adequately communicated to the University regarding a specific course or whether 
each was necessary to enable him to participate in a particular course in light of his disability.”73  
Additionally, “in the higher education context, a plaintiff alleging failure to accommodate under 
Title III or the Rehabilitation Act must show (1) that the plaintiff is disabled and otherwise 
qualified academically.”74  A student who never completed his graduate school application, 
lacked sufficient preparation for graduate coursework as would be obtained at the undergraduate 
level, and generally exhibited academic performance below the standard necessary for admission 
to a graduate program is almost certain to be denied admission on grounds of not being otherwise 
qualified.75  In the extremely unfortunate event that each of these faults apply to a single student, 
as they did to Appellant Mershon, that student is all but guaranteed to lose a lawsuit alleging 
disability discrimination for failure to accommodate.   
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In a more poignant scenario—and if I’m not mistaken, the Supreme Court’s first 
Rehabilitation Act case—the Court held that “[n]othing in the language or history of §504 
reflects an intention to limit the freedom of an educational institution to require reasonable 
physical qualifications for admission to a clinical training program.”76  In that case, Southeastern 
Community College v. Davis, the physical qualification required was the ability to hear and 
process spoken words, as the applicant in question suffered from a severe hearing disability,77 
and could only “be responsible for speech spoken to her [] when the talker gets her attention and 
allows her to look directly at the talker.”78  In other words, the applicant seeking training as a 
registered nurse could only process speech sufficiently for action when she was lipreading.  The 
Respondent contended, among other things, that she could be given individual supervision by 
faculty members whenever providing direct attention to a patient, and that she needed to be 
trained only in some of the tasks a registered nurse is licensed to perform.79  Unconvinced by the 
Respondent-applicant’s proposals, the Court found that the college, “with prudence, could allow 
her to take only academic classes. . . . [where] she would not receive even a rough equivalent of 
the training a nursing program normally gives.  Such a fundamental alteration in the nature of a 
program is far more than the ‘modification’ the regulation requires.”80 
 From Southeastern, one could take away the lesson that any accommodation which 
completely changes the student experience and by necessity limits the prospective student’s 
potential benefit shall be considered unreasonable.     
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77 Id. at 400. 
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 If Southeastern left any doubt, a much more recent request for accommodation solidifies 
the notion that institutions of higher education are allowed to impose basic physical 
qualifications for admission to clinical programs, and that the use of a surrogate to perform tasks 
the applicant cannot perform is not a reasonable accommodation.  A woman diagnosed with 
spinal muscular atrophy, Type III, was denied admission into a medical school program based on 
her inability to meet the school’s Motor Technical Standards, which were deemed “an essential 
requirement for participation in a medical education. . . .”81  The plaintiff-student had requested 
“the appointment of a staff aide or surrogate to perform the physical, motor movements which 
the plaintiff could not perform for herself”82 on account of “the extreme weakness in her arms 
and legs . . . limiting her lifting to only 10 to 20 pounds.”83  The court found that this reduced 
capacity  “would reduce the plaintiff to the role of an observer rather than that of a medical 
student clinician.”84  More directly, the court held that [s]substitution of a surrogate would force 
a fundamental change in the School’s curriculum,”85 constituting an unreasonable 
accommodation.  On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, summary judgment against McCulley was 
affirmed.86 In affirming summary judgment against her, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
made note of a point that is important, if for no other reason than to show sympathy with the 
plaintiff: “[a]lthough McCulley does not intend to pursue a physically demanding specialty, she 
must nevertheless meet”87 her school’s Motor Technical Standards because they are the 
                                                 
81 McCulley v. Univ. of Kan. Sch. of Med., No. 12-2587-JTM, 2012 WL 9490568, at *1, *38 (D. Kan. October 31, 
2013). 
82 Id. at *39. 
83 Id. at *5. 
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standards required by the school, and the ADA does not give courts authority “to make sweeping 
revisions to the content of medical school curricula.”88  
 At times, as in Southeastern and McCulley, sympathetic plaintiffs allege disability 
discrimination in situations where it clearly exists, but the applicable legal framework combines 
with a stubborn institution clinging to the past to deny any form of relief.  In an instance falling 
outside that type of scenario, an engineering undergraduate at the University of California Los 
Angeles (“UCLA”) recently and rather boldly moved for a mandatory preliminary injunction 
against UCLA for denial of reasonable testing accommodations.89  Here, Plaintiff alleged she 
suffers from the disability condition of chronic migraines which, having a tendency to suddenly 
peak in severity, substantially impair her ability to take the timed written exams prevalent in her 
program.90  Despite her acknowledgment that UCLA provided other accommodations, such as 
“extended time on exams, a reduced-distraction environment, [and] the opportunity to retake 
missed exams,”91 Plaintiff claims Defendant had failed to provide reasonable accommodation 
because the accommodations it had already provided were ineffective.  Plaintiff’s desired relief 
was really two sides of the same coin: she sought an injunction which would prohibit UCLA 
from categorically denying her alternative forms of academic evaluation—such as term projects 
and oral exams instead of timed written exams—while simultaneously requiring UCLA to 
provide her these alternative forms of evaluation.92   
                                                 
88 Id. 
89 Sung-Miller v. Regents of the University of California, CV 20-00768 AB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118502, *1 
(C.D. Cal. March 16, 2020). 
90 Id. at *2. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at *3. 
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In this case, the plaintiff faced two significant barriers to success: well-warranted judicial 
hesitancy regarding mandatory preliminary injunctions, where “courts should be extremely 
cautious,”93 and judicial deference.  “The Supreme Court has instructed that courts ‘should show 
great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.’”94 “While the [Ewing] Court made this 
statement in the context of a due process violation claim, a majority of circuits have extended 
judicial deference to an educational institution’s academic decisions in ADA and Rehabilitation 
Act cases.”95 In Zukle, the Ninth Circuit joined the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits in applying 
the Ewing standard so far as to “extend judicial deference ‘to the evaluation made by the 
institution itself, absent proof that its standards and its application of them serve no purpose other 
than to deny an education to handicapped persons.’”96 
Against this standard of deference—Plaintiff Sung-Miller, and many other plaintiffs 
seeking arguably more reasonable accommodation—face long odds and little hope of success.  
Were the attitudes of all educators not so firmly entrenched, and there was greater willingness 
among educators to embrace alternative means of testing when appropriate, I might be able to 
consider judicial deference to academia in a more positive light.  After all, “the design of proper 
academic tests . . . is not itself a science, but, rather, is a judgmental matter in respect to which 
teachers . . . are far more expert than judges and juries.”97  I support judicial deference to 
administrative agency expert knowledge in environmental regulatory matters, and that deference 
exists for exactly the same reason as does deference to professors and universities.  Perhaps my 
                                                 
93 Id. at *5. 
94 Id. at *7 (citing Regens of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)). 
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view is hypocritical.  Perhaps the law is flexible and broad enough to allow for such 
contradictory views.   
Regardless, Sung-Miller needed to overcome judicial deference to UCLA and convince 
the court that “the plain differences between some of the alternatives [she] propose[d] (term 
papers, projects, oral exams) and sit-down exams” were a reasonable accommodation.98  This did 
not happen, and plaintiff’s motion for a mandatory preliminary injunction was denied.99 
As much as I sympathize with the plaintiffs in McCulley and Southeastern, and as much 
as Sung-Miller’s ambitious reach for a mandatory preliminary injunction irks me, I find it truly 
sad that a request for alternative testing methods like this was deemed unreasonable—or at least 
that a student with the grades to prove herself otherwise qualified could not be granted this 
accommodation.  I cannot deny that here, as in Stern, it seems possible to believe Sung-Miller 
was faking it.  I just don’t believe that, and don’t see the harm in providing a more suitable 
means of eliciting knowledge from a student—or at least, giving that student a better chance to 
prove they possess the desired knowledge.  This case does not leave me fond of judicial 
deference. 
Which makes the next case a welcome change, as it presents a rare glimpse into what it 
takes for an educational institution to see its judicial deference evaporate.  In a 1999 case, the 
Ninth Circuit advised that courts may refuse to defer if an institution fails to follow the 
guidelines set forth in Wynne regarding a submission of uncontested facts detailing the 
institution’s thorough investigation of accommodation possibilities.100  Deference will most 
                                                 
98 Sung-Miller, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118502 at *9. 
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100 Wong v. Regents of the University of California, 192 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1999). 
Disability Discrimination in Higher Education - 24 
 
likely not be extended if the requisite factual record is replaced by the head of an institution 
proffering “simple conclusory averment,”101 of the institution’s efforts.  Such was the case when 
the Dean of the School of Medicine at the University of California at Davis denied a student’s 
request for ongoing accommodation without being able to present the court with a factual record 
showing without question that he had investigated the proposed accommodation and its potential 
impact on the school, or alerting the student to the potential of rejection, or notifying any 
university personnel who could before rejecting it, or in truth taking any evaluative action 
whatsoever before denying the accommodation request.102   
It is important to note that the judicial refusal to defer does not automatically indicate a 
requested accommodation is reasonable.  On this note, the Wong court noted that it was not—at 
this stage, anyway—holding Wong’s requested accommodation was reasonable; only that a jury 
could decide it was reasonable, allowing him to survive a motion for summary judgment against 
him.103 A similar case in which a Defendant university also failed to submit any evidence, let 
alone uncontested facts, documenting its thorough efforts to evaluate the reasonableness of a 
requested scheduling accommodation led to a grant of summary judgment being set aside on 
appeal.104  Such an action gives surprising teeth to the claim in Wynne that “there is a real 
obligation on the academic institution to seek suitable means of reasonably accommodating a 
handicapped person and to submit a factual record indicating that it conscientiously carried out 
this statutory obligation.”105 
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In addition to offering an example of deference lost, Wong also points out—through a 
somewhat twisted path—that reasonableness of accommodation “depends on the individual 
circumstances of each case, [and] this determination requires a fact-specific, individualized 
analysis of the disabled individual’s circumstances and the accommodations that might allow 
him to meet the program’s standards.”106  Put another way, an accommodation offered in exactly 
the same format might be reasonable for one student, and unreasonable for another, based on 
their own unique circumstances.  In Wong, the Defendant University of California at Davis 
Medical School asserted that Plaintiff Wong was not otherwise qualified for its program even 
with reasonable accommodation.107 
In challenging the reasonableness of Wong’s accommodation, and his qualification as a 
student, the University pursued three distinct arguments.  The first is one I cannot help but 
consider to be a detestable legal strategy—I call it the “success is failure” strategy—where the 
University argued Wong did not need the accommodation because he had “passed the Pediatrics 
clerkship the first time he took it . . . without any accommodation.”108  Further agitation stems 
from the University’s argument that Wong—who was apparently too successful to require 
accommodation—had simultaneously demonstrated, by virtue of how much time he had taken to 
complete his third year, that he was unable to ever meet the school’s required academic 
standards.109  Additionally, the University contended Wong’s accommodation of eight weeks of 
“additional reading time [] would not have improved the ‘hands-on’ skills with which he had so 
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much difficulty,” although “Wong’s performance in the 1994 and 1995 Surgery clerkships [] 
tend to disprove the University’s assertion. . . .”110 
Admittedly, the fact that Wong had spent nearly four years working on completion of his 
third-year curriculum111 does not inspire great confidence.  However, Wong’s timeline worthy of 
deeper examination, as it was interspersed with several complicating events likely to exact a 
significant toll on anyone.  Shortly after Wong failed his first clinical clerkship in the Summer of 
1991—the first sign of Wong’s academic struggles—his father was diagnosed with lung cancer, 
and Wong accordingly took time off in March 1992.112  Wong returned to school in July of 1992, 
receiving generally positive feedback and passing grades, though some of his evaluators noticed 
he was having organizational and communicational difficulties.113  Wong’s father died three 
weeks after he reenrolled in the Medicine clerkship that he had failed at the beginning of his 
third year, and this devastated Wong.114  Only after failing the Medicine clerkship a second time 
in the summer of 1993—two years after his academic difficulty began—was Wong referred for 
testing at the University’s Disability Resource Center, where it was discovered he had an 
unnamed information processing and self-expression disability.115  While working with a school 
psychologist to develop academic strategies, the school promised—but failed—to appoint Wong 
both a Student Learning Disability Advisor and a disability resource team.116 
Fortunately, I believe, the court found that no argument the University pursued was 
“sufficient to overcome . . . the evidence Wong presented that when given extra time to read 
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between clerkships, he could meet the academic standards of the School of Medicine.”117  It is 
frustrating to consider, however, that the resolution in this case was not a decision that Wong’s 
accommodation was reasonable and that he was qualified with reasonable accommodation.  For 
all the improvement Wong had shown in his grades after receiving accommodation, despite his 
father’s illness and death, and despite the seemingly arbitrary decision by the university to 
spontaneously deny Wong’s accommodation, his academic fate was still in jeopardy.  All of this 
struggle only allowed Wong to fight another day, and while that is better than other possible 
outcomes, I believe disabled students already have to fight hard enough to succeed.  I discussed 
this case in depth because I believe it demonstrates the significant and unfortunate barriers that 
courts, obligated by current law, place between disabled students and success in higher 
education. 
 Another case decided shortly before Wong, concerning a student at the same medical 
school—the University of California at Davis—serves to remind us that “reasonableness is not a 
constant.  To the contrary, what is reasonable in a particular situation may not be reasonable in a 
different situation – even if the situational differences are relatively slight.”118 In this case, 
plaintiff Zukle, like Wong, was diagnosed with a reading comprehension learning disability well 
after admission to the medical school.119  Unlike Wong, however, Zukle experienced academic 
difficulty almost immediately and received eight “Y” grades (a provisional failing grade eligible 
to be remedied upon repeat performance of an exam or clerkship120) in the pre-clinical years of 
her program.121  The University dismissed Zukle for demonstrating a consistent incapacity to 
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develop the skills required of a physician on January 17, 1995, and unanimously decided to 
sustain the dismissal after Zukle’s appeal that June.122  After her dismissal, “Zukle sought eight 
weeks off before each clerkship to read the assigned text for that clerkship in its entirety.”123 
 Eight weeks off to complete reading assignments before each clerkship is exactly the 
same accommodation as Plaintiff Wong would receive from the same school at roughly the same 
time.  Unlike Wong, however, where the plaintiff demonstrated significant academic and clinical 
improvement with accommodation, Zukle did not.  Despite being offered all of the 
accommodations typically provided to students with learning disabilities—including double time 
on exams and a decelerated schedule—Zukle continued to receive “Y” grades.124  Additionally, 
Zukle requested a specific accommodation to rearrange her clerkship schedule to accommodate 
studying for the United States Medical Licensing Exam, Step 1 (“USMLE”) which, if granted, 
would temporarily have left her with two incomplete clerkships.125   
 The University “presented evidence that granting this request would require a substantial 
modification of its curriculum.”126  The court recognized—as Zukle herself admitted—that “no 
student had been allowed to rearrange her clerkships in the manner Zukle requested” . . . and the 
court thus had “little difficulty concluding that this would be a substantial alteration of the 
Medical School's curriculum.”127  As well, the court recognized that “simply because the 
Medical School had granted other students requests to proceed on a decelerated schedule, does 
not mean that Zukle’s request was reasonable.”128  The court ultimately concluded that allowing 
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Zukle “to remain in Medical School on a decelerated schedule would have lowered the Medical 
School’s academic standards, which it was not required to do to accommodate Zukle.”129  
Accordingly, the court dismissed Zukle’s claim for failure to establish disability discrimination 
under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.130   
Perhaps anticlimactically, my final case for discussion is hardly a landmark case, and it 
holds no precedent outside the 10th Circuit.  However, no case discovered during my research 
for this paper triggered greater anger than this one, and rationally or not, the injustice present in 
the majority of these cases make me angry.  That said, in Cunningham v. University of New 
Mexico Board of Regents, plaintiff Cunningham was diagnosed with Irlen Syndrome during a 
medical leave of absence from his first year of medical school. 131  Among other symptoms, Irlen 
Syndrome causes bright and fluorescent light sensitivity, poor reading comprehension, eye strain, 
and migraines.132  Cunningham was denied (an unspecified) request for accommodation from the 
University of New Mexico (“UNM”) when he returned to school in 2007, though he managed to 
complete the first two years of his program by mitigating the effects of Irlen Syndrome with 
prescription colored glasses and medicines.133  Cunningham took his first attempt at the USMLE 
Step 1 that same year, but “[t]he bright, fluorescent lighting in the small Step 1 testing room 
caused Mr. Cunningham’s severe headaches to flare up and resulted in him having difficulty 
reading and concentrating on the test materials.  He failed by a narrow margin.”134   
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Cunningham then applied to take the USMLE a second time, and concurrently applied for 
accommodation from the New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners (the “Board”), the entity 
responsible for administration of the USMLE.135  Despite Cunningham’s submission of 
documentation from a physician and clinical psychologist explaining his diagnosis and need for 
accommodation, the Board denied Cunningham’s accommodation request and, in its denial, 
“cited the complete lack of evidence of any formal accommodations in Mr. Cunningham’s 
past.”136  There is a true cruelty found in the Board’s denial of accommodation to a disabled 
individual who had no evidence of a formal accommodation for disability because the only 
institution at which he had ever needed accommodation also denied his request.  The injury is all 
the more severe as Cunningham had also “requested the assistance of the UNM Disability 
Committee in obtaining the desired accommodation from the Board.137   
In denying this request, I can only assume the Board did not understand Cunningham’s 
diagnosis to be a new manifestation, one that could not be supported by past history, as 
evidenced by the Board’s request for “‘extensive and voluminous’ records” of Cunningham’s 
disability history.138  Without submitting the records requested by the board—almost assuredly  
because such records did not exist—Plaintiff Cunningham took the MLE without 
accommodation a second time, and failed by a margin similarly narrow to his first attempt.139  
Plaintiff Cunningham subsequently filed disability discrimination claims under the ADA, 
Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. §1983—all of which were dismissed by the district court.140  I 
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am appalled by the district court holding that Cunningham “was not disabled because, inter alia, 
he was able to mitigate the impairment brought on by his Irlen Syndrome.”141   
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit seized on the jurisdictional issues of the case.  Focusing on 
ripeness, the court considered the fact that Cunningham’s complaint was filed after his second 
failed attempt at the USMLE—when a student has three such attempts prior to expulsion—as 
depriving the Board of rendering a final judgment that could in fact be ripe for adjudication.142 
Admittedly, the Tenth Circuit was on legally solid—yet morally detestable—footing when it 
ignored the merits of Cunningham’s claim due to ripeness issues. 
And yet, the appellate court was not finished skewering Mr. Cunningham.  Though it 
declined to rule on the merits of Cunningham’s case, the court did see fit to comment on them.  
In unique social parlance by which I am enraptured, the court ran headfirst into the biggest issue 
of the case without the slightest hint of recognition it had done so.  Summarizing a very long-
winded dismissal of Cunningham’s case, the court decided that UNM could not be held liable for 
its refusal to provide accommodations to Cunningham, because “Mr. Cunningham demonstrated 
that he did not need an accommodation to pass his medical school classes or tests.”143 This to me 
is a prime example of the “success is failure” phenomenon, where Cunningham’s perseverance 
and self-sufficiency in seeking mitigation measures—as well, likely, as intense studying—both 
enabled him to succeed in the absence of accommodation, and also cost him the accommodation 
he clearly needed.   
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The court continued its foray into my contempt when it decided that even if UNM had 
provided Cunningham’s requested accommodations, such action could not have aided 
Cunningham obtain accommodation from the Board for the USMLE—due to the Board’s 
independent judgment and administration of the exam—even though the primary reason the 
Board denied Cunningham accommodation was that he lacked sufficient documentation of his 
disability and related struggles, documentation he would have had if UNM had granted his 
accommodation request.144  In contemplating this case, I cannot help but see the worst version of 
the ouroboros our legal system has to offer.   
V.  Statistics  
 The following statistics are all sourced from United States Census Bureau data from 
2015,145 and are intended to help illustrate the dearth of disabled students in higher education.  
Based on a total sample size of 212,132 people, 12% of Americans aged 25 and older had earned 
an advanced degree—here defined as anything above a Bachelor’s degree—by 2015.  The 
statistics show that having a disability is one of the greatest demographic barriers to success in 
higher education, as only 5.7% of individuals with a disability also had an advanced degree.  For 
comparison, 12% of both men and women held advanced degrees.  The greatest difference in 
advance degree attainment by age was found between two age groups I would not have guessed:  
only 10.9% of Americans aged 25 to 34 reported having an advanced degree, compared to 13.8% 
of Americans  aged 35 to 44.  That difference—2.9%—falls well short of the disparity where 
advanced degree attainment is 7.2% higher among the non-disabled population of all Americans.  
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Only a very limited number of racial demographic factors exceed that disparity.  For example, 
only 4.7% of Hispanic respondents reported having an advanced degree, compared to 21.4% of 
Asian respondents. 
VI.  Solutions 
 First and foremost, I believe judicial deference to academic institutions needs to be 
restrained, and the burden of proof on students with disabilities must be reduced.  In reading 
these cases, academic standards seem less like worthy goals of education and more like a grab 
bag of excuses that can be used to shake loose challenging students.       
 Another method of increasing representation and success of disabled individuals in the 
realm of higher education is through raising the awareness and opening the minds of established 
professionals to the plight of disabled students.  The Association of American Veterinary 
Medical Colleges’ (“AAVMC”) Annual Data Report of 2019-2020, a 63 page document 
dedicated to analyzing the diversity of the incoming and first year veterinary medical classes in 
the United States, does not mention disabled students once.146  Similarly, organizers called a 
regional meeting of the American Veterinary Medical Association (“AVMA”), focusing on 
diversity and inclusion in veterinary academia, “the first major conference to focus on disability 
and accessibility in veterinary medicine.”147 That was just in 2016.  At that conference, Dr. Beth 
Sabin, associate director for international and diversity initiatives for the AVMA, advised that 
“[w]ith some thought, conversation, and minimal effort, [veterinary] practice owners can 
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implement changes to better accommodate disabled individuals, whether those individuals are 
working for them or they are clients. . . it’s not about making things easier for some, it’s about 
providing opportunities for all.”148  Dr. Willie M. Reed, dean of the College of Veterinary 
Medicine at Purdue University, addressed the need for “a culture of inclusion, and more people 
willing to advance the cause.  The profession needs to reflect the population.  Our profession will 
become irrelevant if we don’t change with the world.”149 
 The more we are able to free professionals from the “I did it this way, so you do it this 
way” mindset, the easier it will be to devise and implement modern curricula more likely to 
facilitate the success of disabled individuals.  Melinda Frye, DVM, PhD, associate dean of 
veterinary academic and student affairs at Colorado State University (CSU), advocates for 
abandoning some of the rigid ideas about what a veterinary student must do to demonstrate 
competency.150  Lisa Greenhill, senior director for institutional research and diversity at the 
AAVMC, conveys that “[n]early 12% of Doctor of Veterinary Medicine (DVM) students self-
identify as having some type of disability,”151 and sees a shift in attitude recognizing that “maybe 
the veterinary student doesn’t have to do everything. . . . We have seen a shift in schools that 
emphasize how to better use the team versus the individual.”152 
 One very simple way that more disabled students could succeed in veterinary medicine 
would be to endorse limited licensure—to allow students to be licensed to practice only small or 
large animal medicine.  Students with physical disabilities could still become wonderful 
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veterinarians and work with dogs and cats in shelters, or provide needed care for the rabbits and 
hamsters that young children adore.  There is no sense in requiring students who—by reason of 
their disability, if not personal preference—will be forever unable to work with large animals 
professionally to demonstrate their skill in performing rectal examinations on dairy cattle, or 
lameness analysis in horses.  And yet, it would seem the “you have to do it this way because I 
did it this way,” mentality remains entrenched, and limited licensure is not a legal option 
anywhere in the United States as yet.  Yet even the North American Veterinary Medical 
Education Consortium (“NAVMEC”) recognizes that veterinary medical “graduates typically 
focus on one or a few species or a discipline (e.g. public health).”153  Why force an unnecessarily 
broad education on a student who cannot physically benefit from it, when even the most able-
bodied students do not generally practice so broadly? 
 I believe the limited licensure concept could be successfully applied in other fields 
requiring higher education degrees, to the benefit of individuals with disabilities as well as the 
public at large.  In the field of law, for example, several states have begun to experiment with 
limited licensure programs.  “In 2018, Utah approved a new class of legal professionals called 
licensed paralegal practitioners (LLPs), making it the second state behind Washington to take 
such action.  LLPs are permitted to help litigants in a wide variety of cases, including separation, 
divorce, name changing, and custody and support.”154  And while the Washington State Bar 
Association’s concerns over the cost and lack of interest in the program resulted in a vote to 
                                                 
153 North American Veterinary Medical Education Consortium (NAVMEC).  Roadmap for Veterinary Medical 
Education in the 21st Century.  http://www.aavmc.org/assets/data-
new/files/NAVMEC/navmec_roadmapreport_web_booklet.pdf  Accessed December 3, 2020. 
154 Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System.  Limited Legal License Programs Are Important to 
Opening Access, But They Need to Be Unencumbered.  October 25, 2019.  https://iaals.du.edu/blog/limited-legal-
license-programs-are-important-opening-access-they-need-be-unencumbered.  Accessed December 4, 2020. 
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sunset the program by the Washington State Supreme Court,155 Barbara Madsen—that court’s 
former chief justice—penned a scathing dissent and noted that “the cost of growing and 
maintaining this group of licensed professionals is less than 1 percent of the Association’s 
budget.”156  Supporters of LLLT and similar programs claim “the opposition stemmed from 
lawyers who feared ‘that their market share [would] be eroded’ by nonlawyer technicians’ . . . 
‘even while lawyers are suffering underemployment and massive student debt.’”157  While 
concerns over unemployment in unstable markets—whether before or during the Covid-19 
pandemic—are certainly sympathetic fears, they tend to miss one very substantial point:  
programs such as the LLLT have been designed, at least in part, to provide greater access to 
justice than America currently achieves.  According to a study by the Legal Services 
Corporation, [l]ow-income Americans receive inadequate or no professional legal help for 86% 
of the civil legal problems they face in a given year.”158  This would seem to be a substantial 
market for more cost-effective and narrowly tailored legal services—that will never be within 
reach of fully licensed lawyers, and thus liable for eroding their market share—and those 
services could be provided by LLLTs.  Such narrowed, shorter-term programs may more 
appealing alternatives for individuals with and without disabilities who would prefer the shorter 
curriculum. 
                                                 
155 American Bar Association.  How the Washington Supreme Court’s LLLT program met it’s demise.  
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 Limited licensure in the medical field already exists to some extent, and for surprisingly 
cost-effective reasons:  “[y]ou wouldn’t expect a heart surgeon to be the person taking your 
blood sample, nor would it be reasonable to pay that person’s rate to do so.  Why should it be 
any different with legal services?”159  As well, limited licensure could easily be expanded in the 
medical field:  not every medical student necessarily wants to be an emergency room physician, 
subject to the physical demands ingrained in school standards.  Especially in the era of covid-19, 
the need for infectious disease and other forms of medical researchers is likely to grow.  Why 
limit the number of people qualified to do that research by imposing irrelevant physical strength 
requirements needed for work they would never do?    
 Another way to potentially shift attitudes and increase representation and success of 
disabled students in higher education is simply through additional lawsuits.  Provision of 
substantial additional funding to the Legal Services Corporation could significantly increase its 
resources to fund lawsuits from those otherwise unable to afford legal redress, which includes  I 
sincerely believe a surge in disability litigation could encourage more schools to accept that 
allowing a student like “Zukle to remain in Medical School on a decelerated schedule would 
[NOT] have lowered the Medical School’s academic standards.”160  In a dream world, such 
schools would even see the challenge of elevating more students like Zukle up to their precious 
standards as a significant source of pride, rather than an intolerable drain of resources. 
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VII.  Conclusion. 
 We do not live in a dream world.  We live in a harsh world where the law is frequently 
lagging behind social expectations.  We live in a world where students with disabilities are still 
often treated as getting a leg up with accommodations that really only level the playing field.  
We live in a world where schools and employers see disabled applicants as liabilities, not people. 
 As the son and grandson of wonderful teachers, I have tremendous respect for 
professional educators at all levels.  I recognize how hard educators work, and how high their 
burden is to produce successful students.  I also recognize that, at least in several of the cases 
discussed—notably Wong and Zukle—the Defendant University undeniably made prolonged 
efforts to accommodate the student-plaintiffs.  I recognize that educational institutions have 
finite financial and personnel resources available, and in many cases simply must triage the 
students whose chances of success seem like too much of a drain on those resources.  I recognize 
that a decision to dismiss a student for failure to demonstrate successful academic performance 
does not automatically equate to a personal attack on that student, no matter how much that 
might feel like the truth.  Just as judges must frequently decide cases simply on facts and law that 
strongly contrast their personal opinions, so too must academic institutions dismiss students they 
would retain in an ideal world. 
Implementing any of the changes I have suggested—whether limited licensure or reduced 
deference--will take time and significant cultural shift, both within the legal field and in the 
professions discussed.  Change is likely to be slow, but civil rights in America have never seen 
rapid adoption for any group.  So long as avenues to pursue and accelerate change exist, 
however, change will occur.  I hope my discussion will help advance change in some small way. 
